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ELMER E. HILPERT*
Of the many problems raised in the course of the federal con-
demnation of a vast number of properties during World War II,
none proved more troublesome than the problem of the liability of
the condemnee for current state and local taxes and assessments.
And the present state of the decisions provides a solution of the'
problem that is something less than satisfactory.
The problem is posed when the real property tax systems of the
several states are juxtaposed with the doctrine of reciprocal inter-
governmental tax immunity which stems from Marshall's famous
dictum in McCulloch v. Maryland., The real property tax of any of
the states is invariably ad valorem in form; in a manner of speak-
ing its administration is continuous from the time of the assessment
or valuation of the realty for tax purposes which occurs early in
the "tax year," through the successive steps of "equalization"
among individual taxpayers, property classes, and local govern-
mental units, fixing of the tax rates, and billing of the taxpayers,
to the ultimate collection of the tax, which generally occurs at or
near the end of the "tax year" and may extend in whole or in part
into the next succeeding "tax year." The "tax year" may or may
not correspond with the "calendar year," and the liens for taxes
of the several state and local governments "attach" at different
times within the "tax year." Where the time for the "attachment"
of the tax lien is not expressly fixed by state statute, the time for
its "attachment" depends on the occurrence of varying "events,"
in the course of the "tax year," as determined by state statutory or
decisional law.2 But, while ad valorem in form, the real property
tax like every other tax is ultimately payable out of the income from
the realty,3 and thus in an economic sense the real property tax is
* Professor of Law, School of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.;
member of the Missouri and Ohio Bars.
'4 Wheat. 316 (U.S. 1819).
'THE TAX RESEARCH FOUNDATION, TAx SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD, (6th ed.
1935).
' It is true that the real property tax is not always in fact payable out of
income from the realty; but, when it is not, such taxes become "delinquent," as
in perods of depression or as in urban "blighted" areas, in either of which
events legislative relief of one kind or another usually follows.
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relatable to the use and occupation of the realty, or the receipt of
its rental value, during the course of the "tax year." Hence, it is
the almost invariable practice in a voluntary private sale of realty
during the course of the "tax year" to adjust the seller's and the
buyer's tax liabilities by contract to their pro rata use and occupa-
tion of the realty, or the receipt of its rental value, during the "tax
year."' 4 Even in "involuntary" transfers of realty during the course
of the "tax year," as when a life tenant (or other life beneficiary)
dies within the course of the "tax year," such an adjustment of the
tax liabilities of the life tenant and the remainderman (or of the
reversioner) to their pro rata use and occupation of the realty or
the receipt of its rental value during the course of the "tax year"
has been recognized.5 But when the federal government condemns
private property during the course of the "tax year" the United
States, as the successor in title, is immune alike from taxation and
from the operation of the tax lien6 either in its entirety or as to any
proration thereof.7 Then the problem for determination is whether
the state and local governments involved shall lose all or a pro rata
share of the taxes as the result of the federal government's tax
immunity, or whether the condemnee, although deprived of the use
and occupation of the realty or the receipt of its rental value for
what may be a very large part of the "tax year," shall nevertheless
bear the burden of that whole year's taxes.
On any re-examination of the doctrine of reciprocal intergov-
ernmental tax immunity it would be arguable that such immunity
should not apply, despite Marshall's dictum, where the reciprocal
government's tax is neither onerous nor discriminatory, as it was in
MeCulloch v. Maryland; but the extension of the doctrine well
beyond these limits is so embedded in our jurisprudence that it is
very unlikely that it will be re-examined-or modified to this degree
if re-examined. 8 The burden on the condemnee could be lessened
by the voluntary assumption by the United States of that share of
the tax burden that would be imposed on a voluntary transferee of
the realty, in analogy to the provision in some states that the tax
exemption of a charitable corporation does not arise until the "tax
'E.g., "Closing Practices of St. Louis Real Estate Exchange" provides, " ..
taxes. ., if any, are to be adjusted to date of closing on the basis of 30 days
to the months,. . " Gii'S MissouRI REAL ESTATE FORMS 138 (2d ed. 1931)
And see U.S. v. Certain Parcels of Land in Philadelphia, Pa., 130 F 2d 782, 784
(C.C.A. 3d 1942).
'See Notes, 17 A.L.R. 1384, 1397 (1922); 94 A.L.R. 311, 320 (1935), 126
A.L.R. 862, 865, 869 (1940) See also 2 ScOTT, TRuSTS § 237 (1939).
'United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274 (1941)
Washington Water Power Co. v. United States, 135 F. 2d 541 (C.C.A. 9th
1943)
'Cf New York ex rel Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937); Pittman v.
Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21 (1939)
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year" next following its acquisition of the realty.9 But thus far
the only statute of the United States on the subject of tax liability
in federal condemnation proceedings provides merely that
The court shall have power to make such orders in respect
of encumbrances, liens, rents, taxes, assessments, insurance,
and other charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable. 10
And (especially since the provision with respect to taxes and
assessments is found among provisions with respect to "private"
encumbrances) this section of the statutes hardly expresses a pur-
pose to prorate the real property tax liability so as to bring about
the assumption of a part thereof by the United States.
It is arguable, however, that the statute permits the district
courts in federal condemnation proceedings to adjust the tax lia-
bility of the condemnee to his pro rata use and occupation of the
realty or the receipt of its rental value during the course of the "tax
year," and to deny the state's claim for the balance of the taxes for
that year as against the federal government. Thus the economic
loss resulting from the federal government's tax immunity is
borne by the state and local governments against whom the federal
government's tax immunity exists rather than by the private indi-
vidual, as the involuntary transferor of his property for the "public
good." This conception of the meaning of "the court shall have
power to make such orders in respect of . . . taxes, assessments,
... if any, as shall be just and equitable" seems to have been ap-
plied by the district courts in several cases.,'
This view was expressed by the order of the district court in
People of Puerto Rico v. Palo Seco Fruit Co.12 In this instance
the federal government by condemnation proceedings obtained title
to and possession of the appellee's land during October, 1941. The
federal district court for Puerto Rico ordered that the insular gov-
ernment was entitled to receive out of the money deposited in court
as compensation only half of the property taxes for the fiscal year
current at the time the property was taken. The district court in its
order said (although its did not base its order on this ground) that
There is really very little equity in exacting a property
tax from the taxpayer after he has been deprived of his
property .... 13
And the district court went on to say that, under the power con-
ferred by the last paragraph of U.S.C.A., Section 258a, which gives
See Note, 63 A.L.R. 1332 (1929)
'.46 STAT. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1946). (emphasis supplied.)
"United States v. Certain Land in City of St. Louis, Mo., 29 F Supp. 92
(E.D. Mo. 1939); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Prince George's
County, Md., 40 F Supp. 436 (D. Md. 1941).
136 F. 2d 886 (C.C.A. 1st 1943).
"Id. at 887.
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it authority to make such orders in respect of taxes and assess-
ments, if any, "as shall be just and equitable," it was disposed to
the view that it
might make an order in respect to encumbrances or liens
which would require the payment only of the taxes accrued
and payable up to the time of the taking.1 4
The Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversing the
District Court of the United States for Puerto Rico in the Palo Seco
case and awarding the insular government the full amount of the
current taxes out of the compensation award questioned this view
of the section's scope;" and it has been expressly denied in a
number of other cases. 16
The basis for denying such an "apportionment" of current
taxes and for awarding the full amount thereof to the taxing gov-
ernment out of the compensation award has been that the federal
courts in condemnation proceedings are to be governed by the
state law on the question and that the state law in these cases re-
quired the imposition of the full amount of the current taxes on
the condemnee, regardless of the fact that he had been deprived
of a commensurate use and occupation of the premises or of the
rental value of the property during the tax year.'7
If the "state law" to be applied in federal condemnation pro-
ceedings is the composite of state statutes relating to the assess-
ment, equalization, "security" for and collection of taxes, and these
statutes are to be inexorably applied without regard to the super-
vening and uncontemplated fact of the federal condemnation of
l Ibid.
"r'Ibid.
" United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Philadelphia, Pa., 130 F 2d
782 (C.C.A. 3d 1942); Collector of Revenue within and for the City of St.
Louis, Mo. v. Ford Motor Co., 158 F 2d 354 (C.C.A. 8th 1946). And see 79
AL.R. 116 (1932), Supplemental Decisions.
" United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in San Diego, San Diego County,
Calif., 44 F Supp. 936 (S.D. Cal. 1942), United. States v. Certain Parcels of
Land in Philadelphia, Pa., 130 F 2d 182 (C.C.A. 3d 1942); Collector of Rev-
enue within and for the City of St. Louis, Mo. v Ford Motor Co., 158 F. 2d
354 (C.C.A. 8th 1946). For a discussion of these cases, see -Infra. But see Re
South Carolina Public Service Authority, 37 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. S.C. 1941), hold-
ing, alternatively, that (1) a South Carolina statute of 1939 did not require,
as alleged, the imposition on the condemnee of taxes accruing after'he had been
dispossessed of his property and before payment of the award into court and
that (2) any such state statute would be violative of the "due process" clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and unconstitutional. Compare with the view of
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit, in the Palo Seco case,
supra, that the "apportionment" of current state taxes under 40 U.S.C.A.,
Section 258a, or presumably any other federal statute, would "destroy" the
state's tax lien, and thus be violative of the."due process" clause of the Fifth
Amendment!
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the property taxed, there will be no occasion for the "apportion-
ment" of the taxes of the condemnee, unless a state statute, as is
rarely the case, so provides.13 Again, it may be that the whole bur-
den of the federal tax immunity may be borne by the taxing state
and local governments if the condemnation proceeding is instituted
at a time when, under the state tax laws (either statutory or deci-
sional) the tax lien has not yet "attached," although part of the tax
year has already elapsed. 19 In either event, the burden of taxation
is hardly "equitable"; and in both events the variations that exist
among the several states as to the times when tax liens "attach"
and as to whether they "attach" continuously or whether there is
an hiatus, so to speak, in the tax encumbrance of realty, introduce
the elements of haphazardness and lack of uniformity in this phase
of the law of federal condemnations.
But the state statutes respecting the administration of their real
property tax systems were written, one may safely presume, with-
out the problem occasioned by the condemnation of land by the
sovereign in mind. Thus, even if the federal government is with-
out power to legislate or adjudicate an "apportionment" of the con-
demnee's tax liability in *federal condemnation cases, the state
courts are not without power to ameliorate the tax burden of the
condemnee in condemnation proceedings instituted by that state or
by one of its local subdivisions. In state and local condemnation
proceedings the same problem of tax "apportionment" appears,
and it has been considered in a small number of states, with the
usual varying results.* In some states the full amount of current
taxes has been imposed on the condemnee; in others the tax has
been "apportioned" according to his pro rata use and occupation of
the property during the "tax year." It is the law as declared by
each state on this precise point that is to govern in federal con-
demnation proceedings. Where there are no state decisions on this
precise point it seems clear that the federal courts are not required
to impose the full amount of current taxes on the condemnee by
awarding it out of the compensation paid into court, merely be-
" The tax statutes of Washington and New Jersey make express provision
for an arbitrary apportionment of taxes between vendor and purchaser in the
absence of contrary stipulations. Borough of Edgewater v. Corn Products
Refining Co., - N.J. -, 53 A. 2d 212 (1947); Washington Water Power
Co. v. United States, 1:35 F. 2d 541 (C.C.A. 9th 1943). In both cases current
taxes were "apportioned," under these statutes, as to the condemnees and, of
course, the balances "remitted" as to the United States.
See People of Puerto Rico v. Palo Seco Fruit Co., 136 F 886 (C.C.A. 1st
1943), where the court points out the hiatus in the tax liens of successive years
during which, if condemnation proceedings were instituted, no tax liability
would fall upon the condemnee. And see cases collected in 79 A.L.R. 116, Sup-
plemental Decisions.
"' See cases collected in 79 A.L.R. 116 (1932) and Supplemental Decisions.
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cause (a) inexorable following of the state tax statutes written
without this problem in mind, vould compel this result, (b) be-
cause the decisional law on this point in another state having com-
parable tax statutes would compel this result, (c) because this re-
sult was attained in other federal condemnation proceedings arising
under the laws, either statutory or decisional, of another state, or
(d) because the appropriate state's decisional law has awarded the
taxing unit the amount of taxes already delinquent when the con-
demnation proceedings were instituted or has awarded the amount
of special benefit assessments. Still, an examination of the recent
federal cases strongly suggests that all of these factors have oper-
ated to cause the denial of an "apportionment" of the condemnee's
tax liability in federal condemnation proceedings.21
It does not follow, as seems to have been assumed in many fed-
eral cases, from the mere fact that a state's tax lien has "attached"
at the time that the state or one of its local subdivisions condemns a
parcel of property, that the courts of that state would hold the con-
demnee liable for the full amount of current taxes unless he had
also enjoyed the use and occupation of the premises or received
their rental value during the "tax year." Thus in Re Twelfth
Ward22 the New York court imposed the current taxes on some
and not on other condemnees involved in the same condemnation
proceedings, although there was the usual inchoate tax lien on all
the properties at the time of their condemnation. The New York
court thus stated the principle according to which it granted relief
to some of the condemnees from the entire tax burden that would
otherwise have been imposed on them by the mere mechanical ap-
plication of the state's tax statutes:
It is equally clear that, at the time of the actual appro-
priation of the property by the city, the owners were entitled
to be relieved of all burdens incident to their ownership.
Certainly it would not be "just compensation" to take a
man's land, and compel him to pay the taxes and assessments
thereafter levied on the property, while at the same time
withholding the purchase price. Undoubtedly, had the title
completely vested in the city on the 9th day of January, 1895,
the property owners would have been relieved from all obli-
gations of this nature. Now it appears that some of these
property owners were deprived of all beneficial use of their
property on that date, while others had thereafter but lim-
ited use; and yet all the awards were, as specified in section
14 of the report "subject to the amount due and unpaid on
"1 See, for example, United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Eau Claire,
Wis., 49 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Wis. 1943), and, for other cases, see Supplemental
Decisions to 79 A.L.R. 116.
' 40 App. Div. 281, 58 N.Y. Supp. 58 (1899). To the same effect, see Re
Riverside Park, 59 App. Div. 603, 69 N.Y. Supp. 742, aff'd, 167 N.Y. 627, 60
N.E. 1116 (1901)
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account of taxes and assessments lawfully confirmed prior
to, and a lien upon, the premises for which the said awards
have been made, at the date of this our report." Upon the
city's theory, therefore, the owner must not alone be de-
prived of the unrestricted use of his property and of the ad
interim use of his money, but he must also be compelled to
pay for its police protection, and for public improvements
charged against it as a benefit, during all the period of delay,
for which he is in no way responsible, and which he is power-
less to shorten. It will be seen that, if this theory be correct,
the owner's award would be constantly diminished by each
year's delay, until, if the period were long enough, it would
be entirely wiped out. It can hardly be contended that a
theory which, logically followed out, would under any pos-
sible circumstances produce such a result, affords a satis-
factory basis for an award of "just compensation." 23
Hence, if all the "state law" that appears in a federal condemna-
tion proceeding is to the effect that under the state's tax statutes
the property was subject to an inchoate tax lien at the time the
condemnation proceedings were instituted, it does not follow that
the mechanical application of the tax statutes would not have been
relieved against as a matter of "equity" had the issue been presented
in the courts of that state. And thus a federal court is under no
necessity of imposing the entire amount of current taxes on the
condemnee merely because the state's tax lien has already "at-
tached" or because the courts of another state with identical or
closely similar tax statutes have imposed the entire amount of cur-
rent taxes. Nevertheless, a number of federal cases seem to have
based their imposition of the full amount of current taxes on the
condemnee either on (1) the mere finding that, under the state's
tax statutes, the tax lien had already "attached" or on (2) the mere
fact that other federal or state decisions had based their holdings
on the finding that, under the tax statutes of the states there in-
volved, the tax lien had already "attached. -24
The difficulty with which a federal court is confronted in the
absence of state decisional law on the precise question of the lia-
bility of a condemnee for current taxes, is illustrated in Allen,
County Treasurer v. Henshaw et al.2 5 There lands in Oklahoma
were condemned and title thereto taken by the United States on
or about March 15, 1943. Awards were made by the federal dis-
trict court and checks therefor issued, payable jointly to the county
treasurer and each individual landowner in order that the treasurer
might retain sufficient funds to pay any taxes for which such con-
demnees might be liable. The county treasurer, in keeping with the
theory applied in many prior federal condemnation cases arising in
40 App. Div. 281, 58 N.Y. Supp. 58 (1899).
79 A.L.R. 116 (1932), Supplemental Decisions.
197 Okla. 123, 168 P 2d 625 (1946)
1949]
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other states, proposed to retain an amount sufficient to cover current
taxes for the "tax year" 1943. One of the condemnees brought a
writ of mandamus in the state court to compel the treasurer to pay
over this controverted amount. The trial court granted the writ,
and it was sustained by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. While
the Oklahoma "law" on the subject as announced by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court also turned on the date on which the state's tax
lien "attached," that date was made to depend on an "event" in
the "tax year" not necessarily consistent with decisions in other
states having tax statutes otherwise similar to those of Oklahoma.
The Henshaw case thus not only illustrates the difficulty which
confronts a federal court in condemnation proceedings when there
are no applicable state decisions on the precise question, but it also
suggests a happy procedural solution of the problem which invites
a state court decision on the matter.
Almost all states impose on the condemnee in state or local con-
demnation proceedings the full amount of any taxes that have
already become due and owing and remain uncollected at the time
the condemnation proceedings were instituted; and where there is
a personal liability for real property taxes in addition to the lien
against the property, this is the uniform result reached by the rela-
tively few state courts which have passed on the matter.26 Although
such state decisions are no authority whatsoever for imposing the
full amount of current taxes on the condemnee, still the decision
of the federal court in Cobo, City Treasurer v. United States27 is
unexceptionable; but it is wholly distinguishable from cases requir-
ing an order respecting current taxes.
In the Cobo case the owner of the property was dispossessed
by the federal government early in February of 1932. At that time
the taxes for the "tax years" of 1930 and 1931 had long since been
due and payable, whereas the taxes for 1932 were "accruing" in
the course of the "continuous" administration of Michigan's tax
statutes. The City of Detroit intervened in the condemnation pro-
ceedings and moved for an order directing the payment to the city
out of the award of the amount of the "back" taxes for 1930 and
1931. The motion for an order with respect to these "back" taxes
was granted. There was no claim for any part of the taxes that
would have become due and owing sometime in 1932 and no order
with respect thereto was made. And yet the decision in the Cobo
case seems to have had an influence in other federal cases when
the resolution of the condemnee's tax liability was concerned with
current taxes.
The state decisions uniformly hold that a condemnee is liable
See Note, 79 A.L.R. 116 (1932).
94 F 2d 351 (C.C.A. 6th 1938)
[Vol. 10
TAX AND ASSESSMENT LIABILITY
for the amount of any "special assessments" levied against the
land and due and payable at the time the condemnation proceedings
are instituted.2 6 These decisions are, however, based on the wholly
different theory of taxation underlying "special assessments," as
contrasted with annually recurring real property taxes. Strictly
speaking, a tax "is imposed for the purpose of supporting the gov-
ernment generally without reference to any special advantage which
may be supposed to accrue to the person taxed." Such a tax is each
citizen's contribution to the costs of maintaining the general serv-
ices of government in promoting the public safety, health and wel-
ware. An assessment, on the other hand, is a charge which is
"predicated upon the principle of equivalents or benefits which are
peculiar to the persons or property charged therewith, and which
[is] assessed or appraised according to the measure or proportion
of such equivalents." 2 By hypothesis, then, the condemnee's prop-
erty had its value enhanced when the public improvement financed
through the "special assessment" was made; such enhanced value
will have been reflected in the award of damages to the condemnee;
and the imposition on the condemnee of the full amount of the
"special assessment" still due and owing is theoretically sound and
wholly consistent with decisions from the same state prorating the
current tax liability of the same condemnee in the same proceed-
ings. Such state decisions, awarding the full amount of "special
assessments" to the taxing unit, do not in any way bespeak the rule
of that state with respect to the imposition or proration of current
taxes; and such state decisions therefore should not govern a fed-
eral court's disposition of the current tax liability in a federal con-
demnation proceeding arising in such states.
Of the federal decisions in which the liability for current taxes
was raised, three especially purport to turn at least in part on the
precisely applicable state decisional law.30
In the first of these three cases, United States v. Certain Parcels
of Land in City of San Diego,:1 current taxes were imposed in their
entirety on the ground, in part, that the California decisional law
compelled this result. The federal district court relied on Matin
' See, especially, City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 2d 138, 39
P 2d 401 (1935); Ross v. Gates, 183 Mo. 338, 81 S.W. 1107 (1904), and see
Note, 79 A.L.R. 116 (1932).
Ridenour v. Saffin, 1 Handy 464 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1855).
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in City of San Diego, Calif., 44
F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Cal. 1942), United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in
Philadelphia, Pa., 130 F. 2d 782 (C.C.A. 3d 1942), Collector of Revenue within
and for the City of St. Louis, Mo. v. Ford Motor Co., 158 F 2d 354 (C.C.A. 8th
1946). These three cases were also based, in large part, on the fact that, under
the states' tax statutes, the tax liens had already "attached" at the time the
condemnation proceedings were instituted.
144 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
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Municpal Water District v. North Coast Water Co. 3 2 and on City
of Los Angeles v. Superior Court.3 3 In the Main case the Water
District had previously condemned the defendant's land and dis-
possessed it within the current tax year. Later, the taxes remaining
unpaid, the land was sold for taxes. The Water District redeemed
the land and brought suit against the defendant for reimbursement
on the grounds (1) that there had been a warranty against encum-
brances which had been breached by defendant's failure to dis-
charge the tax lien, and (2) that the amount of taxes current at
the time of the making of the condemnation award was deductible
from the amount of the award. The California court found that
neither of the grounds urged would support a recovery, and held
for the defendant. In the City of Los Angeles case the city was
permitted to deduct from the compensation award the amount of
"assessments for certain street improvements," which had been
based on the benefit conferred on the property at the time the im-
provements were made and which had been due and payable before
the institution of the condemnation proceedings. Neither of these
cases support the federal district court's view, in the San Diego
case, supra, of California decisional law respecting a condemnee's
liability for current taxes; indeed, the Main case, supra, tends to
support the contrary view; and the federal court wholly over-
looked other California decisions which bear more directly on the
question.3 4
In United States v Certain Parcels of Land in Philadelphia,3r
the federal district court apportioned the taxes for the year current
in which the condemnation proceedings had been instituted accord-
ing to the condemnee's use and occupation of the property during
that "tax year." The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Third
Circuit, reversed the order of the district court and imposed the
entire amount of the current year's taxes on the condemnee on the
ground, in part, that Pennsylvania decisional law compelled this
result. The Circuit Court relied principally on Philadelphia v. Penn-
sylvania Company for the Instruction of the Blind,36 Dougherty v.
City of Philadelphia,37 and William G. Halkett Co. v. City of Phila-
delphia.3 8 The first two of these cases held that the exemption from
taxation expressly granted charitable corporations by the State of
Pennsylvania does not begin until the "tax year" next ensuing
' 40 Cal. App. 260, 180 Pac. 620 (1919).
2 Cal. 2d 138, 39 P 2d 401 (1935)
"1 See, for example, Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Pacific Co., 31 Cal. App. 100,
159 Pac. 992 (1916).
130 F 2d 782 (C.C.A. 3d 1942)
214 Pa. 138, 63 Atl. 420 (1906).
"112 Pa. Super. 570, 172 Atl. 177 (1934)
115 Pa. Super. 209, 175 Ati. 299 (1934)
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the "tax year" in which the property was acquired by a charitable
corporation. That determination would seem to have little, if any,
bearing on the precise issue then before the federal courts. In the
Halkett case, sapra, the United States had begun negotiating for
the plaintiff's property in the latter part of 1931 and later took it
through condemnation proceedings, but the plaintiff "was in pos-
session of his property, either by himself or his tenants, and en3oyed
the use and income from it until November 4, 1932."31 The plain-
tiff brought "amicable assumpsit and case stated" to determine the
right of the local taxing authorities to collect taxes for the "tax
year" of 1932. The court held that since the plaintiff as condemnee
had remained in possession of the property and "enjoyed the use
and income from it" within the 1932 "tax year" until November 4,
1932, the city could collect such taxes as were attributable to that
period of occupation-especially in view of the fact that the city
had previously "voluntarily made such apportionment for the bene-
fit of the plaintiff. . . ." This decision neither clearly supports the
view that current taxes should be imposed in their entirety nor
that they should be prorated according to the condemnee's use and
occupation of the premises during the current "tax year." In view
of "the custom, which by common consent, [had] acquired the
'force of law'" that taxes "are prorated between the vendor and
purchaser on a sale of the land," 40 it is conceivable that the Penn-
sylvania courts might, were the issue squarely presented to them,
adopt the rule of apportionment in condemnation proceedings.
In Collector of Revenue within and for the City of St. Louis v.
Ford Motor Co.," the federal district court apportioned the current
taxes for the year in which the condemnation proceedings had been
instituted according to the Ford Motor Company's use and occupa-
tion of the premises within that year. On appeal by the City of
St. Louis, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth
Circuit, reversed the order of the district court and imposed the
entire amount of the current year's taxes on the condemnee on the
ground, in part, that Missouri decisional law required this result.
The Circuit Court of Appeals relied chiefly, if not solely, on Jasper
Land and Improvement Company v. Kansas City.42 The issue of
the condemnee's liability for taxes accruing after the institution
of condemnation proceedings was squarely presented in the Jasper
case, and the Missouri court imposed the entire year's taxes on the
condemnee. It was argued in the Ford Motor Company case, on
behalf of the condemnee, however, that the Missouri court's decision
'Ibzd. (Emphasis supplied.)
"United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Philadelphia, Pa., 130 F 2d
782, 784 (C.C.A. 3d 1942).
"158 F 2d 354 (C.C.A. 8th 1946).
283 Mo. 674, 239 S.W. 864 (1922).
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in the Jasper case had depended on (1) the rule that, under the
Missouri Constitution, an owner may not be dispossessed until the
amount of the award has been paid into court for his benefit and
(2) that, in that instance, the owner-condemnee had remained in
possession during the whole of the current "tax year" and that the
taxes accruing during that year were thus "due and owing" at the
time he was actually dispossessed.43 Both the facts, as reported,
and the language in the opinion of the Jasper case are equivocal, at
best; and it may well be that the Circuit Court of Appeals' view of
Missouri decisional law, as announced in the Jasper case, would be
reaffirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court. In any event, the
decision in the Ford Motor Company case can be wholly supported
under this view of the governing Missouri decisional law on the
precise question involved.
In the present state of the federal decisions and in view of the
tendency to decide the issue in particular cases either on the
mechanical application of the appropriate state's tax statutes or
the decisional law of another state with similar tax statutes-as
declared either by the courts of that state or as "found" by the
federal courts-it would be better to adopt either of the procedures
resorted to in United States v. 25.936 Acres of Land, More or Less,
in Borough of Edgewater4 and in Allen, County Treasurer v.
Henshaw.4' In the Edgewater case, the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals, Third Circuit, remanded the cause to the federal district
court with the direction "to retain jurisdiction for a reasonable
length of time to permit the Borough of Edgewater and [the con-
demnee] to litigate in the courts of New Jersey" the issue respect-
ing the condemnee's liability for current taxes. This was done in
Borough of Edgewater v. Corn Products Refining Co.,46 and an ap-
portionment of taxes based on New Jersey state law was obtained.
4 7
In the Henshaw case the federal district court issued checks in the
amount of the awards payable jointly to the county treasurer and
each individual condemnee; the question of the liability for current
taxes was litigated in the Oklahoma state courts, and the non-
liability of the condemnee for the entire amount of the current
taxes was authoritatively established as a matter of state decision
in the very case affected.
If either of these procedures should become the established
practice in federal condemnation proceedings, the federal courts
, The writer was "of counsel" for respondent Ford Motor Co. and argued
the matter in the Circuit Court of Appeals.
"153 F. 2d 277 (C.C.A. 3d 1946).
197 Okla. 123, 168 P 2d 625 (1946).
40136 N.J.L. 220, 53 A. 2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 57 A. 2d 39 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1948).
"I See note 18 supra.
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would be relieved of the difficulty of determining the state decisional
law on the point; and this alone would go a long way toward
clarifying the whole problem. But there would still exist the near
certainty of variation in result among the several states, and it is
also likely that many state decisions would continue the element of
haphazardness in result as among condemnees whose properties
were taken at varying times within the "tax year." It is not at all
clear that it could be successfully urged that the amount of current
taxes, imposed on a condemnee and not relatable to his use and
occupation of the premises within that "tax year," be considered
as an element of damages in determining the amount of the award
to him.4 8 All this seems to suggest the need for Congressional
relief, in the interests of uniformity and certainty-and of essential
fairness to condemnees-by a statutory "assumption" by the United
States of a proration of the taxes accruing and current during the
year in which properties are condemned by the federal government.
18 Am. JUR. § 260 (1938).
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